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A seller can benet from information about the valuation a poten-
tial buyer places on the good. Under some circumstances, improved
information raises social welfare. But under other circumstances, the
information has private value but no social value, so that agents may
spend too much on collecting information. A government which col-
lects and disseminates some information about valuations can limit
spending by private agents on data collection, thereby increasing so-
cial welfare. That is, governmental provision of information may be
useful not because information is socially useful, but because it limits
the amount private agents spend on collecting information.
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11 Introduction
Laidlaw v. Organ 15 U.S. 178 (1817), decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1817, concerned the eects of private information held by a buyer
or a seller. Organ bought tobacco from Laidlaw on the same day that news
broke that a peace treaty had been accepted between America and Britain,
lifting a naval embargo and raising the US price of tobacco by thirty to
fty percent. Organ, unlike Laidlaw, was aware of the news, allowing Organ
to make a large prot. The court unanimously ruled that a party cannot
withhold information with the aim of deceiving the other party, but a party
was not bound to communicate all its information.
The Laidlaw v. Organ case is especially interesting because it involves the
division of prots between two parties|the information aected the trans-
action price, but not the trade itself. In other words, Laidlaw v. Organ
concerned rent seeking or a \directly unproductive activity."1 The analysis
below illustrates how a seller may collect excessive information. That part of
the paper is not novel, as will be seen in the literature review. What is novel
is showing how government can limit private spending on data collection by
providing private agents with partial information. This view contrasts with
the standard view which sees government collecting data because the private
market has too little of it. I argue the opposite|the government wants to
limit private data collection.
My approach, to be plausible, should broadly accord with the stan-
dards expected of government statistics. In a report issued by the National
Academy of Sciences, Martin, Straf, and Citro (2005) write that \public
policy makers are best served by statistics that are accurate, timely, and rel-
evant for policy decisions. Even more, the operation of a democratic system
of government depends on the unhindered ow of statistical information that
citizens can use to assess government actions and for other purposes. Federal
statistical agencies are established to be a credible source of useful, accurate
statistics in one or more subject areas that are available to the public and
policy makers on a timely basis ... And credibility requires concern for both
the reality and appearance of impartiality, and of independence from political
control. It is the primary mission of agencies in the federal statistical system
to work to ensure the goals of accuracy, timeliness, relevance, and credibility
1For seminal works on such activity, see Tullock 1967, Krueger 1974, Posner 1975,
Bhagwati 1982, and Tollison 1982.
2of statistical information" (p. 3). In this paper I give dierent reasons for
the desirability of such statistics.
2 Literature
A demonstration that the private benet of information can exceed the social
benet, and that indeed the social benet can be zero, is a major contribution
by Hirshleifer (1971). He shows this result for an exchange economy with
identical people trading future claims: an agent who knows future demands
can generate a prot, beneting himself at the expense of others, and leaving
social welfare unchanged.
Others build on this insight. Shavell (1994) analyzes incentives to acquire
information about valuations before sales transactions, concluding that vol-
untary disclosure results in socially excessive incentives to acquire informa-
tion.
Consideration of how governmental dissemination of information aects
social welfare is discussed by Morris and Shin (2002). They argue that when
each individual benets from taking the same action that others do, but
suers when his action does not match the state of nature, then public infor-
mation can reduce welfare. Svensson (2006), however, shows that under most
plausible parameter values, under this framework social welfare is increased
by dissemination of information. Extending Morris and Shin (2002), Wong
(2008) considers how increased provision of information by the central bank
reduces the incentives of private rms to collect information on the state
of the economy, and nding that therefore the central bank may maximize
social welfare by limiting the amount of information it provides. Cornand
and Heinemann (2008) consider how public announcements which serve as
focal points for higher-order beliefs can reduce social welfare, concluding that
public information should always be provided with maximum precision but,
under certain conditions, not to all agents.
One of my results is that increased spending by one agent can reduce
spending by others. This eect relates in spirit to the analysis of limit pric-
ing. In particular, Bain's classic work (1956) suggests that an incumbent
may want to distort his price downwards (as by increasing capacity), with
the aim of preventing entry. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) show how imper-
fect information can induce such behavior: if the entrant is unaware of the
incumbent's costs, an incumbent who behaves as if he has low costs may deter
3entry. Similar in spirit is the argument by Caplan (2008) that \the [gas] tax
holiday is a relatively cheap symbolic gesture that makes truly bad policies
less likely." He, however, looks only at governmental activity, whereas I look
at how governmental activity can reduce wasteful private activity.
3 Assumptions
The market consists of one buyer and one seller. The seller posts a price. The
buyer has a reservation price of VL, VM, or VH, with VL < VM < VH. The
prior probability of valuation Vi is i. The buyer but not the seller knows
the value of the good. In any case, the good is worth more to the buyer than
to the seller. Getting information on whether the valuation is VL instead of
VM or VH costs FL MH. Getting perfect information costs FL M H.
I spoke of getting information on LMH. But the information collected
need not be so direct. It can instead concern demographic or economic data
which inform the seller of the likely valuation by the buyer.
4 Outcome with no government intervention
Consider the seller's behavior when government provides no information. The
seller can collect either no information, information on L MH, or information
on L M H. In the absence of any information, the seller faces the following
choices. If the seller charges VL, he earns VL. If the seller charges VM,
his expected revenue is (1   L)VM. If the seller charges VH, his expected
revenue is (1   LM)VH. Suppose rst that VL(1L) > VM and that VL >
(1 LM)VH. That is, in the absence of any further information, the seller
would charge VL.
We can now ask about the value of information to the seller. Suppose the
seller gets information on L MH. A seller who nds that the buyer values
the good at VL charges VL. A seller who nds that the valuation is either
VM or VH (but does not know which) must decide whether to charge VM or
else VH. If he charges VM his expected prots are
 FL MH + LVL + (1   L)(VM): (1)
A seller who charges VH has expected prots




4A seller with perfect information has expected prots
 FL M H + LVL + MVM + (1   L   M)VH: (3)
The seller who has no further information will charge VL if VL > (1  
L)VM and VL > (1 L  M)VH, generating the socially ecient outcome.
Nevertheless, VL may be less than prots given by expressions (??) (??). The
seller would then incur the cost of collecting information, which is socially
useless. Moreover, data collection can reduce social welfare. Suppose that
in the absence of any further information, the seller would charge VL. But if
he nds that the reservation value is either VM or VH, then he may charge
VH. That means that with some positive probability a potential buyer with
valuation VL orVM will not buy the good, though he values the good more
than the seller does.
5 Government collection of data
5.1 Seller collects too much information
A natural way to limit an activity which is costly but not socially useful is to
tax it. It is dicult to see, however, how the collection of information can be
detected and ned. And surely any such policy would be viewed skeptically
in any democracy.
A dierent, second-best, approach is for government to provide partial
information. The government may provide information on L MH (that is,
whether the buyer's valuation is VL or not); that would induce the seller to
charge either VL or instead VM (if the appropriate parameter values hold).
The seller may nd it unprotable to incur the additional cost of FL M H to
get perfect information, which may allow him to charge the price VH. That is,
the government can induce the seller to spend less on gathering information.
To illustrate why government collection of data which limits private col-
lection can be ecient, suppose that a seller who knows that the valuation
is either VM or VH charges a price VM. If the data show a valuation of VL,
then clearly the seller will collect no further information. If the data reveal
that the valuation is MH, the seller will collect no further information if
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VH instead of VM) increases his prots by more than the increase in social
benets|the lost revenue from selling less equals the social loss, but the gain
from the higher price is a private gain with no social benets. Therefore, a
private seller may spend too much on collecting information.2 For example,
suppose that FL M H slightly exceeds the gain to the seller of gaining infor-
mation on M H instead of MH. That is, if government gave data that the
buyer's valuation is MH, then the seller would not incur the cost of collecting
further information. But FL M HFL MH may yet be less than the benet to
the seller of gaining the perfect information, and that FL M H is less than the
gain to the rm from getting perfect information instead of no information.
Then, the seller on his own would get perfect information, and government
can improve welfare by providing imperfect information.
For a demonstration that government can increase social welfare by pro-
viding partial information, consider a numerical example. Let the buyer's
possible valuations be 100, 110, or 120, each with probability 1/3. Consider
the seller's prots under dierent conditions of information.
1. In the absence of any further information, the seller charges 100, and
earns revenue 100. (The seller would not, for example, charge 120,
because then his expected revenue is only (1=3)(120) = 40, which is
less than 100.)
2. A seller's expected revenue with perfect information is (1=3)(100) +
(1=3)(110) + (1=3)120 = 110.
3. A seller who knows that the buyer's valuation is either 110 or 120
maximizes expected prots by charging 110. Therefore, a seller with
partial information (that is, who learns whether the valuation is 100 or
not) has expected revenue of (1=3)100 + (2=3)110 = 100 + 20=3.
Suppose the cost of collecting imperfect information is 20=3, and that the
cost of collecting perfect information is a bit under 10. That means that
the seller would on its own collect perfect information, and that if it had
imperfect information it would not spend the 10 to get perfect information.
2Note that government provision of partial information can reduce data collection even
if for any given level of accuracy government has a higher cost of collecting information
that does the private sector.
6Thus if government collects imperfect information, at a cost of 20=3, it
would stop the seller from spending 10 to get the perfect information. Indeed,
government would be wise to spend up to 10 to collect imperfect information.
What we have here resembles immunization|give a small illness to prevent
a greater one.
5.2 Seller collects too little information
Of course, if a seller charges VH when he knows the value of the good is MH,
then the social benet of perfect information will exceed the private benet.
And here government may want to provide information. For a numerical
example, let the buyer's possible valuations be 10, 20+, and 40, each equally
likely. Under imperfect information, the seller would charge 20 + , earning
revenue of 40=3+2=3. Social welfare is higher, (1=3)(20++40) = 20+=3.
Under perfect information, social welfare and prots are identical. So the
private benets of perfect information exceed the private benets.
The general principle is that information collection on the buyer is socially
excessive if it results in the seller charging a higher price.
6 Extensions
6.1 Costs of collecting information
I have assumed that if information on L MH has already been collected,
then the added cost of collecting information on L M H is the same as the
cost when no other information has been collected, namely FL M H. That
assumption is stronger than needed. The qualitative results would hold for
some parameter values if the added cost was smaller than FL M H, but greater
than FL M H   FL MH.
To extend the model further, we can think of government as collecting
data daily, weekly, monthly, or annually. The more frequently it collects data,
the more valuable it is, and the more government deters data collection by
private actors. We can also think of this geographically. Government can
collect data over large regions or small, with the smaller each region, the
more valuable the information to private agents.
76.2 Research and development
The ideas expounded above can be applied in other areas. To give one
more application, this section considers a contest between two agents, with
the agent who exerts the most eort winning the prize. The eort may be
socially useless, or involve a larger social cost than a social benet, as in many
contests. We may think of rent seeking, of lobbying activities, of tournaments
where the winner receives a much larger prize than other contestants, of
patent races, and of innovation races more generally where the rst entrant
earns large prots. To illustrate, I consider below an innovation race, where
each of two rms chooses eort, which determines how fast it will make the
innovation.
Consider a one-period model with two rms. A rm chooses between in-
vesting 0 (in which case it never wins the prize), innovating slowly (indicated
by S for slow), or innovating quickly (indicated by F for fast). The rst rm
to innovate wins the prize, valued at W. If two rms innovated at the same
time, each is equally likely to win the prize. The xed cost of investing in
R&D (either slow or fast) is C. The cost beyond that for action i is Ci.
I shall consider equilibrium behavior under two policies. Suppose rst
that government undertakes some research, making its results known to both
rms. Think of such a policy as government making investment S for each
rm, at zero marginal cost to each rm. Then no one rm will want to do
F when it expects the other rm to avoid F if W=2 >  C   CF + W, or if
W < 2(C + CF).
Suppose next that government does nothing. Then it is not a Nash equi-
librium for both rms to do S if either prots are negative under those
conditions (or if  C   CS + W=2 < 0), or if a rm gains by doing F (or if
 C   CS + W=2 <  C   CF + W). Assume prots are positive when both
rms do S, so that W > 2(C + CS). And suppose that when this condition
holds, some rm would gain by doing F, or that W > 2(CF   CS).
In short, government can reduce eort by the rms if the following three
conditions hold: W < 2(C + CF), W > 2(C + CS), and W > 2(CF   CS).
To demonstrate that these conditions can simultaneously hold, suppose
C = 10 and CF = 10. Let W = 30. Then the rst condition is 30 < 2(10 +
10), which is satised. For the second condition, we have 30 > 2(10+CS), so
let CS = 4. For the last condition we have 30 > 2(10 4), which is satised.
The Nash equilibrium would have mixed strategies. Let a rm do F with
probability f. So a rm is indierent between S and F if (1 f)( C  CS +




W   2CF + 2CS
C + CS
: (5)
This is positive if W > 2(CF   CS). It is less than 1 if W < 2(CF +
CS). Therefore, for some parameter values, a government which provides for
slow innovation can preclude either rm from spending on fast innovation.
Government can thereby reduce social costs.
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117 Notation
Vi Probability buyer's valuation is i
FL M H Cost of obtaining perfect information about buyer's valuation
FL MH Cost of obtaining information on whether buyer values good at VL
or not.
i Prior probability that buyer values good at Vi
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